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Abstract
We briefly review the security of the ping-pong protocol in light of several attack scenarios suggested by various authors since the
proposal of the protocol. We refute one recent attack on an ideal quantum channel, and show that a recent claim of falseness of
our original security proof is erroneous.
1. Introduction
It is now five years that we proposed a quantum cryp-
tographic protocol [1] whose novel feature was that the
bits are transmitted in a deterministic manner: Alice, the
sender, determines the bit value decoded by Bob, the re-
ceiver. Thereby, the transmission efficiency is doubled as
compared to non-deterministic protocols like the BB84 [2],
where only 50% of the transmitted bits can be used for
communication purposes. We were able to rigorously prove
that in the case of a perfect quantum channel any effective
eavesdropping attack can be detected. Specifically, when
Eve, the eavesdropper, tries to gain full information, that is
I0 = 1 bit per message bit, then the detection probability
reads d = 1/2 per control bit. For comparison, in a similar
scenario with Eve fully attacking all transmitted bits, the
BB84 protocol provides a detection probability of d = 1/4
per control bit.
Due to its deterministic nature, the protocol allows two
parties to communicate directly in a secure manner. More
precisely, the direct communication is quasi-secure, which
means that the probability for an eavesdropper to remain
undetected declines exponentially with the length of the
message transmitted. Alternatively, when perfect asymp-
totic security is required, the protocol can be used as a
quantum key distribution scheme: The sender transmits a
meaningless stream of random bits upon which the usual
techniques of error correction and privacy amplification can
be applied so that a shared secret key is established for later
use in classical encryption.
One peculiarity of the protocol is that the carrier of in-
formation, a single qubit, is travelling forth and back be-
tween sender and receiver, which motivated the name ping-
pong protocol. Another peculiarity is that sender and re-
ceiver randomly switch between two modes: message mode
and control mode. Only in message mode a message bit is
transferred and only in control mode an eavesdropper can
be detected with a certain probability. The fact that the
mode can only be noticed by the eavesdropper when it is
too late to escape detection, is an important ingredient to
the security of the protocol and requires careful attention
in experimental implementations.
One experimental implementation of the ping-pong pro-
tocol using entangled photons has been accomplished at the
quantum optics lab in Potsdam, Germany, where the ran-
dom switching between message mode and control mode is
realized in an elegant way [3].
Also meanwhile, several alternative quantum crypto-
graphic protocols have been proposed that are tailored
along the scheme of the original ping-pong protocol,
providing improved efficiency or experimental feasibil-
ity [4,5,6,7,8]. Since the security of these protocols is based
on the security of the original one, we would like to give
a brief review on the security situation of the ping-pong
protocol as it appears nowadays, after several attempts to
attack the protocol in the case of either a perfect or an
imperfect quantum channel. Furthermore, we will show
that some recent claims that the protocol is insecure and
that the security proof is wrong, are erroneous.
2. The protocol in short
Bob, the receiver of information, prepares two qubits in
the Bell state |Ψ+〉ht = 1√2 (|01〉ht + |10〉ht), where h and t
refer to the home and travel qubit, respectively. He sends
the travel qubit to Alice who randomly selects either mes-
sage mode or control mode. In message mode, Alice ap-
plies the encoding operation Zt(j) = σ
j
z to the travel qubit,
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where j ∈ {0, 1} represents the message bit. For j = 1,
the encoding operation transforms |Ψ+〉ht into |Ψ−〉ht and
for j = 0 the state is left unchanged. After encoding, Alice
sends the qubit back to Bob, who then applies a Bell mea-
surement on both qubits, yielding either |Ψ+〉ht or |Ψ−〉ht,
thereby revealing the message bit j. In control mode, Al-
ice measures the travel qubit in the z-basis and announces
the result via the public channel. Upon receiving the an-
nouncement, Bob measures his home qubit in the z-basis
and compares both results. If they differ, the protocol is
continued, otherwise aborted.
3. Cai’s DOS-attack
Qing-yu Cai [9] has proposed a simple attack scheme
that disturbs the information transmission without being
detectable and without revealing any message information,
that is, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack: Eve measures ev-
ery qubit travelling from Alice to Bob in the z-basis. Ac-
cording to the protocol, there is no security check for qubits
travelling back from Alice to Bob, hence the attack remains
undetected. As the attack destroys the entanglement be-
tween home and travel qubit, the bit read out by Bob is
completely uncorrelated with the bit encoded by Alice, so
the message is scrambled. Since Eve’s measurement result
is completely random, she does not gain any message in-
formation.
Let us point out that a trivial modification of the attack
even allows Eve to derministically change the information
transmitted on the channel by flipping message bits of her
choice: Instead of measuring the qubit, Eve applies a σz-
operation. This way, Eve is able to alter message informa-
tion, albeit in a “blind” way. Altogether, the protocol in
its original form protects the confidentiality of the message
but not the integrity (just like the classical one-time pad).
Cai himself has proposed fairly simple ways to protect
the protocol against this type of attack: either quantum
mechanically, by slightly modifying the control mechanism,
or classically, by performing one of the standard methods
of message authentification [10].
4. Wojcik’s attack on a lossy quantum channel
So far, the ping-pong protocol is provably secure only for
the case of a perfect quantum channel. Any imperfection of
the channel potentially opens the door to effective and un-
detectable eavesdropping. Since all quantum cryptographic
protocols are confronted with such a problem, the standard
procedure is to introduce additional steps of error correc-
tion and privacy amplification using the public channel to
distill an asymptotically perfectly secure key. These proce-
dures can be successful exactly if the mutual information
between sender and receiver is greater than that between
sender and eavesdropper [11].
Antoni Wojcik [12] proposed a smart eavesdropping at-
tack scheme that works on a lossy quantum channel and
enables the eavesdropper to gainmessage information with-
out being detected.
The basic idea is the following. After receiving the travel
qubit fromBob, Eve appends an ancilla systemHxy in some
initial state |e0〉xy to the system Hht of travel qubit and
home qubit in its initial state, yielding the state
|init〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)ht|e0〉xy. (1)
She then unitarily transforms this initial state into
|B–A〉 =1
2
|0〉h
(|1〉t|e1〉xy + |vac〉t|e2〉xy
)
+
1
2
|1〉h
(|0〉t|e3〉xy + |vac〉t|e4〉xy
)
,
(2)
where |e1〉,. . . ,|e4〉 are mutually orthogonal. Then Eve re-
sends the travel qubit to Alice, whose encoding operation
σjz on the travel qubit yields
|B–A′〉 =1
2
|0〉h
(
(−1)j |1〉t|e1〉xy + |vac〉t|e2〉xy
)
+
1
2
|1〉h
(|0〉t|e3〉xy + |vac〉t|e4〉xy
)
.
(3)
It can directly be seen from the above terms that upon cap-
turing the travel qubit being sent from Alice to Bob, Eve is
able to find the message bit j with probability 1/2 by mea-
suring the txy system in a suitable basis or, equivalently,
by performing some unitary operation on the txy system
and then measuring in the computational basis. In a con-
trol run the travel mode is found to be in the vacuum state
with probability 1/2. Hence, Eve’s attack introduces 50%
channel losses if she attacks all the time.
If the efficiency of the channel is η < 0.5 then Eve re-
places the lossy channel with a better one, so that the chan-
nel exactly mimics the losses expected by Alice and Bob.
That way, she can attack all transmissions while staying
undetectable, and she creates mutual information between
herself and Alice that exceeds the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob. Hence, even with error correction and
privacy amplification, the protocol would not be secure. If
0.5 < η ≤ 0.6, she attacks the fraction µ = 2(1 − η) of
qubits. For efficiencies above 0.6, the mutual information
between Alice and Eve falls below the mutual information
between Alice and Bob, so that error correction and privacy
amplification can establish the security of the protocol.
Fortunately, Wojcik himself proposed in the same paper
two solutions to protect the protocol against his attack.
One solution is to estimate the qubit error rate (QBER)
which, however, forces Alice and Bob to sacrifice some of
their message bits. The other solution is to delay Alice’s
announcement of the transmission mode (message or con-
trol), until Bob has checked if there is an additional photon
in the travel mode. This way, the attack can be detected
because the particular attack operation not only produces
channel losses, but also (with probability 1/2) inserts a pho-
ton into the travel mode which in control mode should be in
vacuum state after Alice’s measurement. Such an “illegal”
photon travelling to Bob would, if detected, immediately
reveal the presence of the eavesdropper.
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In summary, Wojcik’s attack exploits a security hole of
the protocol in the realistic case of an imperfect quantum
channel using photons. A fairly simple modification of the
protocol closes the hole and restores the security of the
protocol.
5. The ZML-attack on an imperfect quantum
channel
In [15], Zhan-jun Zhang, Zhong-xiao Man, and Yong Li
improved Wo´jcik’s attack by expanding the domain of ef-
fective eavesdropping from nearly 60% to nearly 80% chan-
nel efficiency. The basic idea is fully analoguous toWo´jcik’s
scheme [12]. Eve appends an ancilla system Hxy and uni-
tarily transforms the state (1) into the state
|B–A〉 =1
2
|0〉h
(|1〉t|e1〉xy + |vac〉t|e2〉xy
)
+
1√
2
|1〉h
(|0〉t|e3〉xy
)
,
(4)
where |e1〉,. . . ,|e4〉 are mutually orthogonal. Alice’s encod-
ing operation on the travel qubit yields
|B–A′〉 =1
2
|0〉h
(
(−1)j|1〉t|e1〉xy + |vac〉t|e2〉xy
)
+
1√
2
|1〉h
(|0〉t|e3〉xy
)
.
(5)
Again, by measuring the txy system Eve finds the mes-
sage bit j with probability 1/2. In a control run, the travel
mode is found to be in the vaccum state with probability
1/4. Hence, Eve’s attack introduces 25% channel losses if
she attacks all the time. Reasoning analoguous to that in
Wo´jcik’s publication reveals that the ping-pong protocol
can be successfully attacked for channel efficiencies up to
nearly 80%. However, also here the security of the protocol
can be re-established by introducing the same countermea-
sures suggested by Wo´jcik.
6. The ZLM-attack on a perfect quantum channel
Recently, the same three authors proposed an attack
scheme against the ping-pong protocol, enabling the eaves-
dropper to read out message information without being de-
tected even in the case of a perfect quantum channel, in con-
tradiction to our rigorous security proof for this case [16].
However, their attack scheme is faulty:
According to their attack scheme, Eve prepares an ancilla
state |χ〉 = |vac, 0〉xy in two additional modes x and y, and
applies a unitary operation Wtxy (Eq. (2) in [16]) on the
compound system txy of the travel qubit and the ancilla
modes during the B-A-transmission. Afterwards, the total
system is in the state
|B −A〉 = 1
2
|0, 1〉ht(|vac, 0〉xy + |1, vac〉xy)
+
1
2
|1, 0〉ht(|vac, 1〉xy + |0, vac〉xy).
(6)
It is clear that this attack operation cannot be detected
by the control measurements of the ping-pong protocol: z-
basis measurements on h and t will still be strictly anticor-
related.
In message mode, Alice applies the encoding operation
Zjt = σ
j
z to the travel photon, where j ∈ {0, 1} represents
the message bit, and sends the photon back to Bob. Eve
intercepts the travel photon, applies the inverse operation
W−1txy on the compound system txy, resends the travel pho-
ton to Alice and keeps her ancilla system. The authors claim
that a measurement on the ancilla system reveals informa-
tion about the message bit j encoded by Alice. Indeed, the
authors’ Eq. (7), which supposedly shows the state |A−B〉
after Eve’s (A-B)-attack operationW−1txy, indicates that the
message bit j is partly encoded in the state of the y photon:
|A−B〉j = 1
2
[
(−1)j(Ψ+ht +Ψ−ht)|j〉y
+ (Ψ+ht −Ψ−ht)|0〉y
]
|vac〉x.
(7)
Obvously, a computational-basis measurement by Eve
on the y-mode reveals the message bit j with probability
1/2, otherwise it yields 0. However, this crucial equation is
wrong, which can be seen as follows.When Alice applies her
encoding operation to the travel photon t, the total system
is in the state
Zjt |B −A〉 =
1√
2
[
(−1)j|0, 1〉ht|χ1〉xy + |1, 0〉ht|χ0〉xy
]
,
(8)
where we have set
|χ1〉xy = 1√
2
(|vac, 0〉xy + |1, vac〉xy) (9)
|χ0〉xy = 1√
2
(|vac, 1〉xy + |0, vac〉xy). (10)
As can be seen from above, the message bit j is encoded
in the relative phase between the two components of the
superposition. Since Eve has no access to the home photon
h, she can in no way read out the relative phase. Generally,
consider a state in the space Hh ⊗HE of the form
|Ψ〉 = α|h1〉h|e1〉E + βeiφ|h2〉h|e2〉E , (11)
with 〈h1|h2〉 = 0, and α, β > 0, and where Eve has only
access to the system in HE . Then for Eve the state of the
entire system is indistinguishable from the reduced density
matrix
ρE =Trh{|ψ〉〈ψ|} (12)
= α2|e1〉〈e1|E + β2|e2〉〈e2|E , (13)
where the relative phase φ is no longer available.
In the present case, the density matrix of the total state
after Alice’s encoding operation is
3
ρj = Z
j
t |B −A〉〈B −A|Zj†t
=
1
2
[
|01〉ht|χ1〉xy〈01|ht〈χ1|xy
+ (−1)j |01〉ht|χ1〉xy〈10|ht〈χ0|xy
+ (−1)j |10〉ht|χ0〉xy〈01|ht〈χ1|xy
+ |10〉ht|χ0〉xy〈10|ht〈χ0|xy
]
.
(14)
The state of the system accessible to Eve is given by partial-
tracing over the home photon h,
ρ
(Eve)
j = Trh{ρj}, (15)
which yields
ρ
(Eve)
j =
1
2
[
|1〉t|χ1〉xy〈1|t〈χ1|xy
+ |0〉t|χ0〉xy〈0|t〈χ0|xy
]
.
(16)
Since ρ
(Eve)
j is independent of j, there is no message in-
formation available to Eve. Consequently, the authors’ cal-
culation of the state |A−B〉j , which results from the appli-
cation ofW−1txy to Z
j
t |B−A〉must be faulty. In fact, our own
calculations show that the state after Eve’s (A-B)-attack
W−1txy reads
|A−B〉j = 1
2
[
(−1)j(Ψ+ht +Ψ−ht)
+ (Ψ+ht −Ψ−ht)
]
|0, vac〉xy,
(17)
which is different from the authors’ Eq. (7) (Eq. (7) above)
in that it is impossible for Eve to read out the message bit
by any measurement performed on the ancilla system xy.
In summary, we find that the conclusions drawn in the
commented paper [16] are based on a miscalculation; this
attack scheme is not effective and does not impair the se-
curity of the ping-pong protocol.
7. Cai’s invisible photon attack
Qing-Yu Cai [13] adapted the Trojan horse attack intro-
duced by Gisin et al [14] to the ping-pong protocol: Eve
feeds in an additional photon which is invisible to Alice
and Bob’s detectors, but which is affected by Alice’s encod-
ing operation. The illegal photon is inserted into the travel
mode on the way from Bob to Alice, and it is filtered out
during the transmission from Alice to Bob. Eve detects the
state change of the illegal photon which is caused by Al-
ice’s encoding operation, and thereby obtains the message
bit without being detected. Choosing a wavelength outside
the range of Alice’s detectors is one possible way to make
the illegal photon invisible to the control measurements. As
Cai has pointed out, the attack does not exploit a weak-
ness of the protocol itself but rather of certain imperfect
implementations of the protocol. He also suggests a feasible
solution to re-establish the security of the communication:
Alice and Bob add filters to their setup whose bandwidth
matches the sensitivity range of the detectors.
The generalization is straightforward: The experimental
setup should block any quantum carriers of information
which are invisible to the detectors but which are affected
by the encoding operation.
8. Zhang’s claim that the security proof is wrong
Zhan-jun Zhang challenges the validity of our security
proof altogether [17]. We will show that the claim is based
1) on a misunderstanding of the security proof and 2) on a
miscalculation at a crucial point in the argument.
The author emphasizes that in our security proof the
eavesdropping information I0 is extracted from the travel
qubit only. This is not the case. The maximal amount I0 of
information that can be extracted from the system available
to Eve, is equal to the von-Neumann information S of the
state ρ′′ given by Eq. (8) in our original paper. The state
ρ′′ results from Alice’s encoding operation on the state ρ′
which is given by our Eq. (7) as a matrix representation in
the orthogonal basis {|0, χ0〉, |1, χ1〉}. As we have pointed
out in our paper, the states |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 are states of
Eve’s ancilla system HE . It is therefore not true that the
information I0 is derived only from the state of the travel
qubit. Unfortunately, though, we ourselves have made such
misunderstanding easy because right before our Eq. (8) we
denote ρ′′ as “the state of the travel qubit after Eve’s attack
operation and after Alice’s encoding operation”. This is
a misnomer which we apologize for; it should however be
clear from the context that ρ′′ refers to the state ρ′ after
Alice’s encoding operation, and that the state ρ′ explicitely
includes Eve’s ancilla system.
Based on this misunderstanding, the author constructs a
counterexample against the security proof, where he then
miscalculates the information contents I0t and I0c that can
be extracted from the travel qubit and the composite sys-
tem, respectively. He claims that “as can easily be worked
out”, the values read I0t = 1 and I0c = 2, which would be
in contradiction to the prepositions of our security proof.
Let us explicitely perform the calculation. According to
the author’s counterexample, Eve captures the travel qubit
t in the state |0〉, attaches an ancilla system x in the state
|χ〉x = 1√2 (|0〉x + |1〉x). We find that the state |Ψ′〉 of the
composite system tx after Eve’s attack operation Eˆ given
by the author reads
|Ψ′〉= Eˆ(|0〉t|χ〉x) (18)
= Eˆ
1√
2
(|00〉tx + |01〉tx) (19)
=
1√
2
|0〉t|χ0〉x + 1√
2
|1〉t|χ1〉x, (20)
where we have set
|χ0〉x = 1√
2
(|0〉x + |1〉x) (21)
|χ1〉x = 1√
2
(|1〉x − |0〉x). (22)
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The state |Ψ′〉 has exactly the form given in Eq. (4) of our
security proof, with α = β = 1√
2
. When Alice encodes “0”
she applies the unity operation which gives |Ψ′0〉 = |Ψ′〉;
when she encodes “1” she applies σz to the travel qubit
which gives
|Ψ′1〉 =
1√
2
|0〉t|χ0〉x − 1√
2
|1〉t|χ1〉x. (23)
Note that |Ψ′1〉 is orthogonal to |Ψ′0〉. Assuming that she
encodes “0” or “1” with equal probability (which is tacitly
assumed by the author), the state of the composite system
tx reads
ρ′′ =
1
2
|Ψ′0〉〈Ψ′0|+
1
2
|Ψ′1〉〈Ψ′1|, (24)
which has the entropy I0c = S(ρ
′′) = 1, in contrast to the
authors’ result. In fact, the author’s value of I0c = 2 would
be very surprising: Alice encoded at most one classical bit
by a unitary operation, so the entropy of the resulting state
cannot be higher than one bit. For security reasons, our
protocol makes use only of a 2-dimensional subspace of the
full 4-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by two qubits,
and the entropy of a state in a 2-dimensional subspace is
at most 1 bit.
9. Conclusion
So far, the ping-pong protocol has resisted all serious
attacks brought forward in the last five years, albeit with
slight modifications of the scheme. For the ideal case of a
perfect quantum channel, the initial security proof holds
and is both rigorous and general. For the realistic case of
an imperfect quantum channel, there is no general security
proof but the protocol seems to retain its security.
We suggest that future efforts should go into either figur-
ing out more attack scenarios exploiting channel imperfec-
tions under realistic circumstances or into finding a general
proof for the unconditional security of (a suitable exten-
sion of) the ping-pong protocol in the case of an imperfect
quantum channel.
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